Never-Ending Limitations on S Corporation Losses: The Slippery Slope of S Corporation Debt Guarantees by Lipman, Francine J.
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship
2002
Never-Ending Limitations on S Corporation
Losses: The Slippery Slope of S Corporation Debt
Guarantees
Francine J. Lipman
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub
Part of the Corporation and Enterprise Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you by Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the
William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lipman, Francine J., "Never-Ending Limitations on S Corporation Losses: The Slippery Slope of S Corporation Debt Guarantees"
(2002). Scholarly Works. Paper 817.
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/817
TAXES/JUNE 2002
NEVER-ENDING
LIMITATIONS ON S
CORPORATION LOSSES:
THE SLIPPERY SLOPE
OF S CORPORATION
DEBT GUARANTEES
FRANCINE LIPMAN EXPLAINS S CORPORATION
BY
FRANCINE LIPMAN
LOSS LIMITATIONS IN THE AREA OF SHAREHOLDER
GUARANTEES, FOCUSING ON THE RECENT TAX
COURT AND SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS IN TF
GROJEAN AND CONCLUDES WITH A SUMMARY OF
THE LESSONS S CORPORATION SHAREHOLDERS
CAN LEARN FROM THE GROJEANS' MISSTEPS.
The income tax laws do not profess to embody perfect economic theory.
-Oliver Wendell Holmes
Introduction
In the Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001,'
Congress has made significant
marginal tax rate cuts for indi-
vidual taxpayers. As a result of
these decreases, for the first time
in years, individual average in-
come tax rates will be lower than
corporate average income tax
rates.' Consequently, more taxpay-
ers may consider organizing and
operating their businesses using an
entity that subjects income to one
level of tax at the newly reduced
individual income tax rates. Tax-2002 F. Lipman
payers seeking a business entity
that combines one level of tax at
the individual taxpayer level with
limited liability generally choose
between the S corporation and the
limited liability company (LLC).
One significant difference be-
tween the S corporation and the
LLC is the amount of net operat-
ing losses that are allowed to pass
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through to each investor from the
business entity. In a business's
start-up phase and during periods
of recession, such as the U.S.
economy's since March 2001,'
businesses often incur net operat-
ing losses. Investors in
pass-through entities include an-
ticipated tax benefits from
pass-through net operating losses
in their investment analysis and
decision-making process. Busi-
nesses desiring to attract and retain
investors must maximize any tax
benefits from their net operating
losses. As a result, any limitations
on pass-through net operating
losses must be carefully considered
and understood before manage-
ment selects its business tax form
or structures its transactions.
S Corporation Loss
Limitations
Unfortunately, the limitations on
pass-through net operating losses
for S corporation shareholders are
significant, complicated and have
"sparked serious controversy and
criticism in the last decade among
practitioners, the judiciary, and
the Internal Revenue Service"
(IRS).4 S corporation shareholders
have and continue to confront
these limitations. Many sharehold-
ers and their tax advisors structure
their S corporation transactions to
attempt to fit within the guidance
that allows current tax benefits for
net operating losses. The resulting
creative S corporation shareholder
debt structures often include varia-
tions of shareholder-level
guarantees. The IRS has success-
fully contested many of these
structures because the courts have
applied strict construction, hold-
ing that S corporation shareholder
basis that allows pass-through
losses does not include any share-U/
holder guarantee or any similarly
characterized debt structures.
This article will discuss S corpo-
ration loss limitations in the area
of shareholder guarantees, focus-
ing the analysis on the Tax Court's
and the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals' recent decisions in TF
Grojean.' The article begins with a
basic primer on the limitations for
pass-through net operating losses
for S corporation shareholders as
compared to members in an LLC
(or similarly, partners in a part-
nership). The primer includes a
detailed explanation of the abso-
lute prohibition on S corporation
loss basis for shareholder guaran-
tees of S corporation debt. Next,
the article discusses the IRS's and
the courts' strict scrutiny and ten-
dency to find in a wide variety of
alternative S corporation share-
holder debt structures shareholder
guarantees and to disallow pass-
through net operating losses. The
article continues with a number
of specific examples of debt struc-
ture recharacterizations, including
the recent case of Grojean.6 The
article analyzes the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals' esoteric and
far-reaching economic discussion
in the Grojean opinion. The court's
opinion demonstrates how courts
may have a predilection to
recharacterize shareholder debt
structures as shareholder guaran-
tees to deny shareholder basis. In
Grojean, no one can deny that Jus-
tice Posner of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals aptly applies
economic analytical tools to sup-
port his decision to ignore the
form of a taxpayer's structure and
recharacterize the shareholder's
debt as a form of guarantee. How-
ever, the court also correctly
admits that "[a]t high enough lev-
els of abstraction ... the difference
between providing and enabling
the provision of funding may dis-
appear."7 As a result, the substance
of any differences between a lender
and a guarantor may be meaning-
less and, therefore, any
recharacterization unjustifiable.
The article concludes with a brief
summary of the lessons S corpo-
ration shareholders can learn from
the Grojeans' missteps.
Introduction to
Basic Rules for
Loss Limitations:
S Corporations
S corporations and LLCs (and
other entities subject to tax as part-
nerships) are pass-through entities,
which generally do not pay any
taxes at the entity level.8 All of the
business income, gains, losses,
deductions and credits are allo-
cated among the owners of the
business and must be included in
each owner's annual tax calcula-
tion. A business's net operating
losses are allocated among and
pass-through to each owner, but
the amount of allowable net oper-
ating loss deduction may be
limited at the owner level.9
A taxpayer's share of a pass-
through entity's net operating
losses is limited generally to the
taxpayer's investment in the busi-
ness."° A taxpayer's business
investment is measured by each
owner's tax basis. The measure-
ment of tax basis for this purpose
is different for a member of an
LLC as compared to a shareholder
in an S corporation. LLC mem-
bers include their allocable share
of indebtedness of the LLC in
their tax basis.' Therefore, the
amount of allowable pass-through
losses for any member of an LLC
is increased by all LLC liabilities,
which are properly allocable to
such member.12
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Comparatively, S corporation
shareholders cannot include all of
the S corporation liabilities in de-
termining their allowable amount
of pass-through net operating
losses. An S corporation
shareholder's pass-through net
operating losses are limited to her
tax basis in her stock and any in-
debtedness of the S corporation
to her. 3 Liabilities of the S corpo-
ration to lenders other than
shareholders (e.g., banks and other
third-party lenders) are not in-
cluded in the calculation for loss
limitations. Even if shareholders
personally guarantee these third-
party loans, they do not receive
any increase in any allowable pass-
through net operating losses.14 Any
losses in excess of this limitation
are suspended indefinitely until
the shareholder has adequate stock
basis and/or direct shareholder S
corporation loans to recognize
these losses. 5 An S corporation
shareholder's suspended losses
must be used by the shareholder
when and if adequate stock basis
or shareholder loans arise or will
be lost forever. A shareholder's
suspended losses may not be trans-
ferred to a buyer through sale, or
an heir or donee through devise
or gift.'6 Compared to LLCs and
other entities characterized as part-
nerships, the shareholder-level
limitations on recognizable pass-
through losses from S
corporations may be significant if
the S corporation has liabilities
other than direct shareholder loans
and extensive losses.
While shareholder-level limita-
tions on S corporation
pass-through losses may be signifi-
cant as compared to LLCs, S
corporations remain a common
business vehicle."7 Existing S cor-
porations are numerous, because
S corporations predate LLCs by a
number of decades.18 Moreover,
conversion of an S corporation
into an LLC may have significant
tax costs. 9 Additionally, S corpo-
rations remain attractive because
S corporation shareholders, unlike
members in an LLC, can avail
themselves of the benefits of the
tax-free reorganizations provi-
sions.20 Therefore, despite the
shareholder-level loss limitations
for S corporations, they remain
an important entity choice. Ac-
cordingly, S corporations and their
shareholders must understand
these loss limitations so that they
can maximize any tax benefits
from pass-through losses.
Denial of Loss Basis
for Shareholder
Guarantees and
Broadly-Determined
Analogous Structures
The ever-expanding denial of loss
basis for shareholder guarantees is
the focus of this article. The de-
nial of loss basis for shareholder
guarantees has evolved from case
law and is particularly troubling,
because third-party lenders to loss
S corporations often require share-
holder guarantees for their loans.
Because many S corporations are
closely-held businesses, 21 third-
party lenders do not hesitate,
especially when the S corporation
is newly formed or generating sig-
nificant losses, to ask for some
form of security in addition to the
assets of the S corporation. Un-
fortunately, as common as this
debt structure may be, shareholder
guarantees of S corporation debt
do not give rise to basis for loss
limitation purposes. This now
black-letter law was born in the
courts. 22 While academics have
criticized this position,23 the IRS
has embraced it and has success-
fully disallowed S corporation
shareholder pass-through losses
because of lack of any basis for
guaranteed indebtedness.24
The black-letter law regarding S
corporation shareholder guaran-
tees is cited to and embodied by
the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals' holding in D. Leavitt.25 The
Leavitt decision holds that there
is no basis increase for S corpora-
tion shareholder guarantees of S
corporation debt absent a share-
holder payment on the debt.26 In
Leavitt, the Fourth Circuit, affirm-
ing the Tax Court, refused to
accept an S corporation
shareholder's position that a third-
party loan guarantee was in
substance the shareholder's equity
in the S corporation. 27 The Leavitt
courts also refused to accept that
the third-party loan was substan-
tively the shareholder's direct loan
to the corporation that provided
basis. 28 The Fourth Circuit deter-
mined that unless and until the
shareholder made a payment on
the guarantee, the shareholder
would not receive any increase in
shareholder tax basis for the share-
holder guarantee.29
Four years before the Leavitt
opinion, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals decided E.M.
Sefe.30 In Se/fe, the court held that
an S corporation shareholder who
issues a guarantee on S corpora-
tion debt is entitled to a basis
increase "where the facts demon-
strate that, in substance, the
shareholder has borrowed funds
and subsequently advanced them
to the corporation."'" The Elev-
enth Circuit continues to apply
this analysis to shareholder guar-
antee loss basis cases, but only
allows basis when the taxpayer has
established that she is both the
borrower and the primary obligor
on the loan, and she contributed
the loan proceeds to the S corpo-
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ration as capital. The Eleventh
Circuit's position is that it will
allow basis if the shareholder can
demonstrate that the guarantee is
not, in substance, a guarantee, but
rather a loan from the third-party
lender to the shareholder followed
by a capital contribution by the
shareholder of the borrowed mon-
ies to the S corporation. No other
circuit court of appeals follows the
MANY SHAREHOLDE
STRUCTURE THEIR S COR
TRANSACTIONS TO ATTEIA
WITHIN THE GUIDANCI
ALLOWS CURRENT TAX E
FOR NET OPERATING LO
RESULTING ... DEBT STR
OFTEN INCLUDE VARIAT
SHAREHOLDER-LEVEL GU/
Eleventh Circuit's analysis for
shareholder guarantees. Moreover,
the Tax Court has assessed negli-
gence penalties and substantial
understatement of tax penalties on
taxpayers who have relied inappro-
priately, in its opinion, on Sefe. 2
The IRS and courts vehemently
apply the rule of law that a
shareholder's guaranty of an S
corporation's loan cannot be in-
cluded as stock or indebtedness
basis absent an economic outlay
by the shareholder. The strength
of this position has resulted in
numerous recharacterizations of
creative shareholder-S corporation
debt structures as "shareholder
guarantees." For example, in TAM
8426006,' the IRS ruled that share-
holders did not obtain basis for
being jointly and severally liable
with their S corporation on a note
to a bank, because the IRS deter-
mined joint and several liability
B
was equivalent to a shareholder
guarantee. Moreover, the courts
have held on numerous occasions
that when an S corporation share-
holder executes a bank loan as a
co-maker with her S corporation,
she does not obtain basis because
she has merely guaranteed the S
corporation's indebtedness. The
courts reason that the shareholder
did not make a direct loan to the
corporation, but
has provided
rather a form of
RS ... guarantee for the
PORATION third-party
IPT TO FIT lender. 4 Simi-
larly, the courts
- THAT have also denied
3ENEFITS loss limitation
;SES. THE basis to share-
holders thatprovide personal
IONS OF assets as security
RANTEES. for S corporation
debt. In each of
the foregoing tax
matters, the courts or the IRS
analogized the substance of the
shareholder debt structures to a
shareholder guarantee, resulting in
the absolute denial of basis for
these S corporation shareholders.
In short, the courts and IRS are
quick to recharacterize shareholder
debt structures as shareholder guar-
antees, because the black-letter law
denial of loss basis for shareholder
guarantees is so sound.
In M.G. Underwood,36 the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals and the
Tax Court reasoned that a
shareholder's debt restructuring
among controlled corporations
merely created a shareholder guar-
antee that would only give rise to
shareholder basis if and when the
shareholder made a payment on
his indebtedness. The shareholder
owned all of the stock of two cor-
porations. When it became
apparent that the shareholder did
not have sufficient basis for his
projected S corporation pass-
through net operating losses, he
restructured the obligations be-
tween his two corporations. First,
the lender corporation surren-
dered the notes executed by the
borrowing corporation, marking
them "paid." Second, the borrow-
ing corporation issued a demand
promissory note to the share-
holder; and third, the
shareholder executed a demand
note to the lender corporation
for the full amount of the origi-
nal indebtedness.
As a result, the borrowing S cor-
poration was indebted to the
shareholder and the shareholder
was indebted to the lending cor-
poration. The Tax Court and the
Fifth Circuit found that under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended ("the Code"), these trans-
actions did not create indebtedness
from the S corporation to the
shareholders. 7 Because the share-
holder had not paid out any
funds, and would not until his
note came due, the courts charac-
terized the structure as
indistinguishable from a guar-
anty.3 8 As a result of this
characterization, the Tax Court
and the Fifth Circuit denied share-
holder basis for pass-through net
operating losses.
A more factually accurate analy-
sis would be that the courts
determined that the restructuring
of the indebtedness did not result
in "true indebtedness" running
from the S corporation to the
shareholder. The courts believed
that because the S corporation's
indebtedness to its shareholder was
related-party debt, it lacked any
substance. 9 The courts stretched
to find an analogy to a guarantee
rather than work through a cum-
bersome "sham transaction, lack
of economic substance" analysis.
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After analogizing the debt restruc-
turing to a guarantee, the courts
concluded that loss basis is not
allowed for shareholder guaran-
tees. As a result, the courts held
the pass-through losses were disal-
lowed due to inadequate loss basis.
The predilection of the courts
to recharacterize shareholder debt
structures as guarantees was illus-
trated recently by the Tax Court
and the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in the case of Grojean°
Most interestingly, Justice Posner
in the Seventh Circuit's opinion
discusses economic scholarship in
the area of guarantees and finds
no economic distinctions between
a lender and a guarantor. This lack
of any economic distinction illu-
minates the irrelevance of the
courts' recharacterization of the
Grojeans' debt structure as a guar-
antee. However, the Seventh
Circuit concludes that, in practice,
there is a distinction between
a lender and a guarantor,
and affirms the Tax Court's
recharacterization resulting in a
disallowance of the Grojeans' pass-
through net operating losses.
The Seventh Circuit
and the Tax Court
Recharacterize
a Loan Participation
Agreement as
a Shareholder
Guarantee and Deny
Shareholder Basis
Thomas and Theresa Grojean
formed an S corporation for the
sole purpose of acquiring a truck-
ing company.41 American National
Bank (ANB) agreed to finance the
S corporation's purchase of the
trucking company, but insisted
that the Grojeans personally guar-
antee the S corporation debt. The
Grojeans were unwilling to under-
take that risk and the parties
negotiated an alternative structure.
The revised structure involved
three loans from ANB. Two of the
three loans were an $8.4 million
loan and a $2.6 million revolving
credit loan, each payable to the S
corporation. The third loan was a
$1.2 million loan to the Grojeans,
secured by the Grojeans' shares of
S corporation stock. In addition,
the Grojeans and ANB entered into
an agreement whereby the Grojeans
agreed to purchase a $1.2 million
participation interest in ANB's $8.4
million loan to the S corporation.42
The Grojeans paid for their partici-
pation interest with the loan
proceeds from ANB on their $1.2
million personal loan. The
Grojeans' ANB loan and the S
corporation's loan each had iden-
tical interest rates and were both
six-year notes due on September 1.
The participation agreement
provided that ANB's interest in the
S corporation note was superior
to the Grojeans' interest in the
note. The Grojeans were entitled
to monthly interest payments only
upon payment of the interest by
their S corporation to ANB and
were not entitled to participate in
any of the principal payments
until ANB had recovered its full
share of principal. Moreover, ANB
had sole authority and discretion
to exercise its rights under its note
to the S corporation without the
advice or consent of the Grojeans.
Unfortunately, the Grojeans' S
corporation suffered net operating
losses. These net operating losses
were allocated to the Grojeans and
were not limited, because the
Grojeans included their $1.2 mil-
lion participation interest in their
S corporation basis for loss limi-
tation calculations. The IRS
denied this additional basis, claim-
ing that the participation was a
disguised guaranty.43 The Tax
Court analyzed the debt structure
created by the Grojeans and ANB
and determined that "[like a guar-
antor, the Grojeans would not be
liable-thus not called upon to
make an economic outlay-unless
its S corporation defaulted."44
The Grojeans argued that they
had made back-to-back loans. Their
position was that there was a bona
fide loan between themselves and
ANB and between them and their
S corporation. However, the Tax
Court found that the participation
agreement made clear that the
Grojeans had not made any bona
fide loan to their S corporation. The
court argued that there was no note
or other contract between the
Grojeans and their S corporation.
Moreover, the court found that
ANB had sole authority and dis-
cretion to enforce all rights under
its notes to the S corporation, with-
out the advice or consent of the
Grojeans. If the S corporation failed
to pay, then the Grojeans had no
direct contractual rights against
their S corporation. In short, the
Tax Court found that there was no
"direct obligation" from the S cor-
poration to the Grojeans.
Additionally, because the notes
from the S corporation to ANB
were the mirror image of the
Grojeans notes to ANB, the court
found that there was complete cir-
cularity of funds. The Grojeans
would make an economic outlay
to ANB only if their S corporation
did not meet its ANB obligations.
Therefore, the Grojeans status was,
in substance, not that of their S
corporation's creditor, but rather
of guarantors of the S corporation's
debt to the bank.
To make matters worse for the
Grojeans, the S corporation's ac-
countants characterized the
Grojeans' participation agreement
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as a guarantee on the S
corporation's financial statements.
Moreover, the Grojeans' own ex-
pert witness pronounced that the
Grojeans would more or less have
no rights against its S corporation
with respect to the S corporation's
default on the ANB notes in a
bankruptcy proceeding. As a re-
sult, the Grojeans back-to-back
loan argument, which the IRS and
the courts have recognized as an
effective vehicle for additional
shareholder basis,45 failed.
Despite these glaring missteps in
the Tax Court and in their well-
intentioned structure, the
Grojeans' zeal for loss basis was
not quashed. The Grojeans ap-
pealed their case to the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.46 In his
opinion, Justice Posner endeavors
to understand the economic dis-
tinctions between a loan and a
guaranty as follows:
The difference between a loan
and a guaranty may seem a
fine one, since, when the
amount is the same, the lender
and guarantor assume the
same risk. The difference be-
tween the two transactional
forms may seem to amount
only to this: the loan supplies
funds to the borrower, and the
guaranty enables funds to be
supplied to the borrower. That
is indeed the main difference,
but it is not trivial or nomi-
nal ("formal"). As explained
in Avery Katz, "An Economic
Analysis of the Guaranty Con-
tract," 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 47,
113-14 (1999), the three-cor-
nered arrangement (borrower,
lender, guarantor) created by
a guaranty makes economic
sense only if the lender has a
comparative advantage in li-
quidity (that is, in being able
to come up with the moneyU/
to lend the borrower) and the
guarantor a comparative ad-
vantage in bearing risk.
Otherwise the additional
transaction costs of the more
complex arrangement would
be uneconomical. At a high
enough level of abstraction, it
is true, the difference between
providing and enabling the
provision of funding may dis-
appear. Indeed, at that level,
the difference between equity
and debt, as methods of cor-
porate financing, disappears.
See Franco Modigliani &
Merton H. Miller, "The Cost
of Capital, Corporation Fi-
nance and the Theory of
Investment," 48 Am. Econ.
Rev. 361 (1958). 47
After this somewhat esoteric eco-
nomic analysis, the Seventh Circuit
concludes that the substance of the
Grojeans' participation agreement
is that of a guarantee.
In response, the Grojeans make
an interesting but circular and un-
successful argument that "[i]f the
government can ignore the form
of [their] "guaranty," reclassifying
it from a loan participation to a
guaranty on the basis of its eco-
nomic substance, why shouldn't
the Grojeans be allowed to reclas-
sify their loan participation
interest as a loan by them to their
S corporation, since there is no
functional difference between the
two characterizations. ' 48 The Sev-
enth Circuit responded, "The
doctrine of substance over form
allows only the government to
recharacterize a transaction. 49
However, Justice Posner, appar-
ently not satisfied with the
one-sidedness of this position,
finds that once again the
Grojeans' own expert undermines
their argument. The court noted
that the Grojeans were trying to
defeat the form of their partici-
pation agreement with the
argument that the substance of
their transaction was a loan to
their S corporation. However, ac-
cording to the Grojeans' expert,
in any bankruptcy preceding, the
substance of the participation
agreement would establish that
the Grojeans were not creditors
of the S corporation and would
escape the one-year extended pref-
erence period for insider creditors
of a bankrupt firm. °
The Seventh Circuit concludes
its opinion by stating "that the
loan participation was in reality a
guaranty."" Thus, the Seventh
Circuit affirms the Tax Courts'
decision to disallow the Grojeans'
pass-through net operating losses
due to inadequate shareholder
stock and indebtedness basis.
Lessons from
the Grojeans
S corporation shareholders desir-
ing basis for pass-through net
operating losses can learn valuable
lessons from the Grojean cases.
Specifically, all of the profession-
als representing the S corporation
and/or the shareholders should be
involved in planning any S cor-
poration transaction to maximize
all legal protections and benefits,
including bankruptcy and tax
matters. The Grojeans' structure
was designed to avoid problems in
case of a bankruptcy (that is, that
the Grojeans did not want to be
characterized as insider creditors
subject to the extended preference
period), but this structure con-
flicted with their tax goals (that
is, that the Grojeans wanted to be
characterized as direct lenders to
their S corporation). As a result
of this conflict, the Grojeans' own
witness repeatedly undermined
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their position that they were di-
rect lenders (through their
back-to-back loan argument) in his
courtroom testimony. The witness
stated that in a bankruptcy pre-
ceding, the Grojeans would not
have any creditor rights. Moreover,
the Grojeans' own accountants
had prepared financial statements
for three consecutive years stating
that the Grojeans' participation
interest was a $1.2 million guar-
antee of their S corporation's ANB
debt. When taxpayers' own profes-
sionals testify against them, courts
are not compelled to disagree. 2
The terms of the ANB note to
the Grojeans' S corporation and the
Grojeans' participation interest in
the note did not provide the
Grojeans with any legal rights
against their S corporation, which
would be typical in a creditor-
debtor relationship. The Grojeans
had no direct contract or note pay-
able between them and their S
corporation. ANB had complete
control and discretion with respect
to any decisions regarding the S
corporation's indebtedness. These
facts undermined the Grojeans' ar-
gument that they had made
back-to-back loans. The loan from
ANB to the Grojeans was evidenced
with a promissory note and their
alleged loan to their S corporation
was evidenced by their participation
agreement with ANB. However,
neither the Tax Court nor the Sev-
enth Circuit found any evidence
of a direct obligation from the S
corporation to the Grojeans.
If the Grojeans had engaged in
properly documented back-to-back
loans, they would have prevailed
at the audit level or in the Tax
Court and never would have vis-
ited the Seventh Circuit.3 The Tax
Court and the IRS have allowed
basis for properly documented
back-to-back loans, even when
there is complete and immediate
circularity of cash. However, un-
der the back-to-back loan structure,
the Grojeans would be subject to
the more onerous "insider credi-
tor preference rules" they were
trying to avoid. The Grojeans and
their professionals had to decide
which goals were more critical. Ap-
parently, in the planning stages,
the choice for bankruptcy protec-
tion overrode the demand for
potential tax benefits. Given the
Grojeans' determined and likely
expensive fight for the tax benefits
through their au-
dit, Tax Court
and the Seventh
Circuit, one won-
ders if they made
the right choice
or if they even
had tax counsel
during their debt
structure plan-
ning stage.
However, Mr.
Grojean was a so-
phisticated and
experienced busi-
nessman who
had worked for
Price Waterhouse
public accountant.
Grojeans should
properly, document and argue
back-to-back loans, this sophisti-
cated and well-reasoned appellate
court opinion will lend more
weight to the already existing
heavy weight of authorities for
recharacterizing S corporation
shareholder debt structures as guar-
antees. Taxpayers can hope that the
Seventh Circuit may have provided
an intellectual thread to the eco-
nomic argument that the
substance of any differences be-
tween a lender and a guarantor are
[SIHAREHOLDERS DESIRING DEBT
BASIS FOR THEIR S CORPORATION
LOANS MUST SCRUTINIZE THEIR
DEBT STRUCTURES AND
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION
TO ENSURE THAT THEY ARE
DIRECT LENDERS TO THEIR
S CORPORATIONS AND CANNOT
BE RECHARACTERIZED FOR ANY
REASON AS GUARANTORS.
as a certified
Therefore, the
have under-
stood the potential consequences
of their debt structure. The
Grojeans may have made an in-
formed decision to structure
their debt in a manner to mini-
mize their perceived greatest
potential risk of bankruptcy. In-
opportunely, the debt structure
that minimized their bankruptcy
risks did not maximize their tax
benefits by increasing their ba-
sis for pass-through net
operating losses.
Conclusion
Regrettably, perhaps as a result of
the Grojeans' failure to structure
economically meaningless and,
therefore, any recharacterization is
unjustifiable. The Seventh Circuit
responded to this high-level eco-
nomic argument by stating, "at the
operational level, because of vari-
ous frictions that some economic
models disregard, such as transac-
tion and liquidity costs, there
really is a substantive and not
merely a formal difference between
lending and guaranteeing." Ac-
cordingly, S corporation
shareholders desiring debt basis for
their S corporation loans must
scrutinize their debt structures and
supporting documentation to en-
sure that they are direct lenders to
their S corporations and cannot
be recharacterized for any reason
as guarantors.
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ENDNOTES
1 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Recon-
ciliation Act of 2001 (PL. No. 107-16)
("the 2001 Act").
2 The corporate tax rate for taxable income
levels between $335,000 and
$10,000,000 is 34 percent, and above
$18,333,333 is 35 percent. The aver-
age tax rate increases from 34 percent
to 35 percent at taxable income levels
between $10,000,000 and
$18,333,333. Code Sec. 11(b). After
the changes to the marginal individual
income tax rates are fully phased in by
calendar year 2006 and thereafter, the
highest individual marginal tax rate will
be 35 percent at approximately
$300,000 of taxable income, with mar-
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Correction
In our February 2002 article by David Keene, A Primer on the Uniform Principal and Income Act: How
Accounting Affects Trust and Estate Beneficiaries, footnote 41 should have read: "Recently, the State of
Washington added a new §106 to UPIA (1997), incorporating a unitrust provision within this law."
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